Explaining AI as an Exploratory Process: The Peircean Abduction Model by Hoffman, Robert R. et al.
Abduction and Explanation    p. 1 
 Explaining AI as an Exploratory Process: The Peircean Abduction Model 
 
September 2020 
 
R.R. Hoffman 
William J. Clancey 
Institute for Human and Machine Cognition 
 
Shane T. Mueller 
Michigan Technological University 
 
[rhoffman@ihmc.us] 
 
Abstract 
 
Current discussions of "Explainable AI" (XAI) do not much consider the role of 
abduction in explanatory reasoning (see Mueller, et al., 2018). It might be 
worthwhile to pursue this, to develop intelligent systems that allow for the 
observation and analysis of abductive reasoning and the assessment of abductive 
reasoning as a learnable skill. Abductive inference has been defined in many 
ways. For example, it has been defined as the achievement of insight. Most often 
abduction is taken as a single, punctuated act of syllogistic reasoning, like making 
a deductive or inductive inference from given premises. In contrast, the originator 
of the concept of abduction—the American scientist/philosopher Charles Sanders 
Peirce—regarded abduction as an exploratory activity. In this regard, Peirce's 
insights about reasoning align with conclusions from modern psychological 
research. Since abduction is often defined as "inferring the best explanation," the 
challenge of implementing abductive reasoning and the challenge of automating 
the explanation process are closely linked. We explore these linkages in this 
report. This analysis provides a theoretical framework for understanding what the 
XAI researchers are already doing, it explains why some XAI projects are 
succeeding (or might succeed), and it leads to design advice. 
 
 
Explanation as an Exploratory Process: The Peircean Abduction Model 
 
"Precisely how much of the business of thinking a machine could 
possibly be made to perform, and what part of it must be left for 
the living mind, is a question not without considerable practical 
importance."  C.S. Peirce, 1887, p. 165 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Abductive inference remains a significant challenge for the field of artificial intelligence. Indeed, 
it is possible to formalize a number of classes of abductive problems (e.g., abductions involving 
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premises that have no incompatibilities). (For a review of formal models of abduction see 
Bylander, et al., 1991). Many philosophers and psychologists have discussed abduction 
(hypothesis formation and testing) as basic to scientific reasoning (e.g., Bruner, 1985; Collins, 
1985; Glaser, 1984; Haig, 2005; Pfeiffer, et al., 1987; Nummedal, 1987; Schurz, 2008; Selz, 
1935). Abduction has been cited as an aspect of, or even a central aspect of critical thinking, 
cognitive flexibility, fluid intelligence, and creativity (e.g., Douven, 2011; Moore and 
Malinowski, 2009).  
 
Diverse definitions of abduction can be found  in the pertinent literatures. Some reports consider 
abduction as "not a logically sound deduction or proof." In some reports, what is referred to as 
abduction is actually a form of induction (see Lenat, 2013, p. 54). This includes inductive 
generalizations from sets of cases in case-based reasoning. Abduction has been defined as the 
achievement of "insight" (e.g., Hoffmann, 2010, 2011). Abduction has been defined variously as 
an accomplishment, an ability, a skill, and as an amalgam of component skills such as evaluating 
evidence, forming mental models, recognizing cues, or other hypothetical cognitive processes. 
Scholars have proposed various patterns of abductive explanation (as many as 15 of them), such 
as "existential abduction, "factual abduction," "analogic abduction," "diagrammatic abduction," 
and "theoretic abduction" (Schurz, 2008). It makes sense that there are indeed distinguishable 
patterns of explanatory arguments. Different things can be inferred (e.g., concepts, laws, models, 
belief systems) and things can be inferred in different ways (e.g., by selecting hypotheses from 
memory or by creating new hypotheses). But such elaborations and taxonomies have triggered 
considerable disagreement about what does and does not count as abduction.  
 
In situations such as this we like to start by looking at the seminal definition and anchor the 
discussion there. Our goal in this essay is to attempt some clarification by revisiting Charles 
Sanders Peirce's original description, and then trying to see how far modern scientists have gone 
in implementing it. Is abduction a single, punctuated act of reasoning, like making a logical 
inference from given premises? Is the property of "being an explanation" a property of 
propositions? Since abduction is often defined as "inferring the best explanation," these two 
questions are closely linked. We explore them in this essay.  
 
We begin by talking a theoretical/scientific perspective, centered (unabashedly) on the 
community of philosophers, psychologists, and computer scientists who write and think about 
abduction. We then attempt to make contact with the world of Explainable AI (XAI) and 
Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS), culminating in some extrapolations in the concluding section. 
 
Peirce the Logician 
 
The concept we call abduction might actually be traced to Aristotle. In Prior Analytics (69a 20ff; 
Smith, 1989), Aristotle discussed what he called "reduction"¾the transformation of the subject-
predicate relations in the major and minor premises of a syllogism (e.g., Socrates is mortal, 
Socrates is a man), so that each of the four basic types (or "figures") of syllogisms could be 
expressed as a type in which the conclusion is an explanatory rule, or we might say, an assertion 
about a class (e.g., All men are mortal). Despite this historical precedent, most discussions 
attribute the concept of abduction to the early American philosopher/psychologist/logician 
Charles Sanders Peirce. 
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In classical formal logics, deduction and induction are completely defined as sets of a few 
assertions, one of which must be a generalization (that is, an assertion about a class). In contrast, 
abduction depends on the reasoner's knowledge—propositions that come from beyond the given 
the observation(s) and premises. Hence, abduction is not the same as inductive enumeration. 
Nonetheless, to philosophers abduction is a form of inference (Douven, 2011; Harman, 1956; 
Lipton, 2004). 
 
In writings spanning 1867-1902, Peirce referred to abduction as "hypothetic inference"—the 
inferring of a hypothetical explanation from an observed circumstance. More than this, abduction 
involves justification. A proposed explanation is “best” because if it were correct the observed 
circumstance would necessarily occur. In this view, abduction would be distinct from both 
deduction and induction. Indeed, it would be a third basic or fundamental type of inference. This 
would seem to retain abduction in the mold of classical logic. 
 
In his discussion of the concept of logical machines, Peirce (1887) restricted himself primarily to 
the conduct of syllogistic inferences in machines designed to go from selected sets of affirmative 
and negative premises. But Peirce thought of inference in a way that differed from the classical 
logics of causation of scholars such as Aristotle and David Hume (1740, Part III). Peirce did not 
seem to mean that abduction was a third classical type (in addition to deduction and induction), 
rather, to Peirce one single type covers the classical forms. 
 
RULE (All men are mortal) 
Case 1 (Socrates is a man) 
___________________________ 
Case 1 falls under the rule (Socrates is mortal). 
 
 
Induction is looking at a number of cases and having an expectation of what you would find for 
future cases. Thus, it can be said that induction is the same thing as generalization, and it is 
always relative to some bounded set or limiting parameters. Of course the difficulty here is that 
since any given case will have an unbounded number of hypothetical features (potential 
premises) about which one might form rules, one can have an unbounded number of rules (see 
Douven, 2011). While this is a distinct problem for logic, it does not seem to have been a 
concern for the Peirce the pragmaticist.  
 
Recent philosophy has maintained this linkage to classical logic. To Gary Shank (1998, p.847-
848), abduction is "rendering what might be thought of as a unique experience into an instance of 
a more general phenomenon.” John and Susan Josephson and Josephson (1995) also described 
abduction in a formal way (see also Aliseda, 2007; Haig, 2005; Minnameier, 2010):  
  
 D is a collection of facts, observations, or “givens,” 
 H explains D, that is, H would, if true, explain D, 
 No other hypothesis can explain D as well as H does, 
 Therefore, H is probably true. 
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In this definition we find an explicit linkage of the fuzzy concept of abduction to the fuzzy 
concept of explanation.  
 
Peirce the logician presented a stronger claim, asking whether abduction is really a third 
fundamental type of inference. In some of his discussions of abduction (e.g., 1903) he seems to 
have considered it as a hybrid, that is, abductive reasoning episodes also involve induction and 
deduction. As Peirce put it, "abduction can partake of the nature of induction" (CP 6.522-8).  
 
But Peirce's definition was psychological (i.e., reliant on the notion of explanation) as well as 
logical (representing abductive inferences formally). To Peirce, the match between a set of data 
and a preferred explanatory frame is more plausible than the match to some other explanatory 
frame or frames, and so we accept the preferred frame as the likely explanation. An abductive 
inference (an hypothesis) is maintained until contradicted by experience, or until experience 
suggests a better (simpler, more general, more plausible, etc.) hypothesis. 
 
The following Table integrates the things Peirce said about abduction in his various writings (see 
also Fann, 1970). 
 
Table 1.  The full Peircean concept of abduction. 
 
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS 
1. Observation of an event or 
phenomenon. 
The observed event or phenomenon is interesting or surprising.  
 
The perception of the event or phenomenon (i.e., categorization) 
hinges on the reasoner's knowledge and concepts. 
 
Discussions in the literature often refer to relatively simple examples 
of abduction, but it is clear especially in Peirce's writing that there is 
an assumption that the observed event or phenomenon is at least non-
trivial, that is, it is a complex event or phenomenon. i.e., it is system 
of interactions whose properties (structure/behaviors) are not 
understood. 
 
2. Generation of one or more 
possible explanations for some 
observed event or phenomenon. 
 
The understanding of the event or phenomenon hinges on the 
reasoner's knowledge and concepts (a sensemaking process).   
The search for a preferred explanation presupposes that the reasoner 
has more than one candidate explanation in mind.  
 
3. Judging the plausibility of the 
candidate explanation(s). 
The judgment can be but is not necessarily based on rationalist 
considerations of necessity and sufficiency. 
 
The judgment can be but is not necessarily based on the estimation of 
probabilities or likelihoods. 
 
4. Resolving the explanation. The plausibility judgment typically (though not necessarily) results in 
a determination that a particular explanation is preferred.  
 
"Inference to the best explanation" (Harman, 1965) implies that one 
has in mind more than one candidate explanation or "competing 
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theory" (see row 2, above) and all but one of them is rejected Proctor 
(2008). 
 
5. Extending the explanation. The determination of a preferred explanation is always tentative, that 
is, subject to disconfirmation by further inquiry even though there is 
an assumption that further instances will conform to the preferred 
explanation. 
 
 
It is noteworthy that these requirements are consistent with the logic-inspired views of Harman 
(1965), Josephson and Josephson (1995), and Lipton (2004), and the psychology-inspired views 
of Proctor (2008) and Lombrozo (2012). "The process of explaining recruits prior beliefs and a 
host of explanatory preferences, such as unification and simplicity, that jointly constrain 
subsequent processing" (Lombrozo, 2012, p. 260). This suggests a reconciliation of the logical 
view and the psychological view.  
 
Reconciling the Logical and the Psychological 
 
There is a tendency for discourses on abduction to either define it  philosophically in terms of 
other fuzzy concepts (e.g., critical thinking, explanation, etc.) or to define it logically as a form 
of inference based on a set of premises. But there is an alternative, in which abduction is  
understood as exploratory modelling; a constructive reasoning activity that is highly dependent 
on knowledge. Tania Lombrozo, a leading psychologist in the area of explanatory reasoning, 
regards explanation and abduction as separate phenomena: And as we pointed out above, the 
reliance on propositions that are external to the abductive syllogism (no matter how many 
premises it begins with) is central in the Peircean definition of abduction.  
 
Referring to the Table 1, the reasoner's motivation for creating a model is that the observed event 
or phenomenon is interesting or surprising. And the observed event or phenomenon is at least 
non-trivial, that is, it is complex and involves interactions whose properties (structure/behaviors) 
are not understood. To Peirce, abduction is an accomplishment, a name for an exploratory 
activity that begins with some information (data, assumptions, hypotheses, partial models, etc.) 
about some system of interest and produces a more complete model of that system, one that is 
consistent with the given information.   
 
In this exploratory modelling view, one might avoid invoking the concept of explanation 
entirely. This is because an explanation is, after all, itself a modelling activity. One might say 
something like "If H is a correct characterization (model) of the system of interest, then the 
collection or assertions D is logically consistent with H’s structure/processes, i.e., D is modeled 
by H; H models D." 
 
More important for present purposes is Peirce's notion that abduction as an activity involves 
going beyond model formation to active exploration. This allows for the discovery and 
description of new or novel experiences, and the rule is tested for plausibility by characterizing 
the new experiences. As a search for a satisfying explanation, abduction has an aesthetic 
component or aspect. As a search for a satisfying explanation, abduction has the aspect of a 
plausibility judgment. Abduction is an activity that is extended in time, having its own structure 
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and processes, often requiring representational tools. It is not a single act of “reasoning” like 
making a logical inference.   
 
To Peirce the abductive derivation of a rule is a creative act. Hence, we come full circle to 
consider the relation of abduction to other psychological processes, such as sensemaking, 
creativity, and critical thinking. 
 
Abduction and Sensemaking 
 
As is indicated in row 2 in Table 1, the notion that abduction is inference to the "best" hypothesis 
presumes that the reasoner has more than one hypothesis in mind. But on this matter, Peirce 
himself muddied the water. Peirce referred to the phenomenon in which an explanation pops out 
in the reasoner's awareness. "...the suggestion comes to us like a flash" (Peirce, 1891; (CP 5.542, 
5.544-5, 5-157). In other words, the very act of perceiving something—the categorizing of it—is 
a type of hypothesis formation, albeit an extreme case, as Peirce says. Is that moment to be 
regarded as an act of inference? If so, it is not of a classical form. In contrast, it hearkens to 
insight, or the "Eureka" phenomenon. In psychological theory, this is "recognition-primed 
decision making" (Klein, 1993), in which the expert rapidly apprehends a situation and 
immediately conceives the best possible course of immediate action without any deliberation 
over alternative courses of action. There is no form of utility analysis.  
 
So, while abduction to a "best" explanation" forces a consideration of the evaluative comparison 
of explanations—in the logical approach—it does not force it in the psychological approach. 
Neither recognition of an anomaly nor the evaluation of plausibility requires that abduction is 
solely an act of recognition or the realization of a single explanation. It is the use of the word 
"best" that implies that more than one explanation is in mind. Peirce did not use that word. He 
referred to observations that are "interesting" or surprising." 
 
That said, in the full Peircean model there is a consideration of more than one possible causal 
model, and an evaluation or comparison of those alternative models leads to a plausibility 
judgment, (i.e., one of them is "best")  In other words, abduction must be more often like 
sensemaking than recognition-primed decision making, even though the formation of an initial 
mental model might be very rapid.  
 
To pursue this more specifically, the Peircean model of abduction is consistent with the 
Data/Frame model of sensemaking  (Klein, et al., 2006), which derived from studies of domain 
experts. The D/F model asserts that sensemaking involves the formation of an initial mental 
model, or frame. The frame raises questions and allows the reasoner to know when to recognize 
anomalies. The frame is evaluated for its plausibility and is explored in a search for confirming 
and disconfirming evidence; it might be adjusted, or discarded altogether. Referring to Table 1: 
• Abduction involves the observation of something that is surprising (row 1).  
• Abduction depends on the reasoner's knowledge, not just on a set of given premises (row 
2).  
• Abduction involves a plausibility judgment (rows 3 and 4).  
• The abduction is extended by a search for additional information (row 5). 
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The key difference between the Peircean model and the Data/Frame model is that the Peircean 
model seems more like a linear narrative, whereas the Data/Frame model is entirely closed loop 
(the data suggest a frame, but at the same time, the frame determines what counts as additional 
data). This difference aside, it is noteworthy that modern research on "naturalistic decision 
making" has led to models that are consistent with Peirce's model of abduction.  
 
This includes consistency with the "Plausibility Cycle" model of self-explanation (Klein, et al., 
2019). The premise of XAI is that the XAI system would generate explanations and present them 
to the user. Psychological research on causal reasoning about complex "real world" events and 
complex systems contexts has shed light on how that people actively engage in self-explanation. 
Some sort of surprising event (or "trigger") leads to a process of story building. But then 
plausibility gaps are revealed and an attempt is made to fill those gaps. Finally, the explanatory 
narrative is tested, sometimes leading to insights that resolve the initial surprise.  
 
In other words, from the psychological perspective the full Peircean model of abduction is 
consistent with models of explanatory reasoning that have emerged in recent years in the field of 
applied cognitive psychology and the study of naturalistic decision making.  These conceptual 
models are all getting at (more or less) the same things. 
 
Another psychological coherence involves the relation of abduction and critical thinking. 
 
Abduction and Critical Thinking 
 
Apparently little research has been done on the skill or capacity for generating plausible best-
guess hypotheses (Lombrozo, 2012). That said, some researchers have demonstrated success at 
teaching critical thinking skills defined in such as way at to embrace the concept of abduction 
(e.g., Schank, 2011).  
 
Kees van Dongen and colleagues (2003) conducted critical thinking training using an intelligent 
tutoring system that encouraged trainees to list multiple alternative hypotheses and then list both 
the confirming and disconfirming evidence for each hypothesis. The manifest purpose of the 
training tool was to mitigate confirmation bias, but the tutoring involved practice on deciding 
which of a set of alternative hypotheses was the best hypothesis. 
 
Another study that relied on a conceptual model that approximates the Peircean concept of 
abduction is one by Karel van den Bosch and Marlous de Beer (2007) on training for decision 
making. The researchers described two elements of critical thinking: 
• Building a story. Explaining a situation, integrating assumptions and uncertainties. This 
corresponds to rows 1 and 2 in Table 1, above. 
• Testing and Evaluating a Story. Identifying incomplete and contradictory information; 
evaluating the plausibility of the story. This corresponds to rows 3 and 4 in the Table 
above. 
 
To Peirce the abductive derivation of a rule is a motivated attempt to understand. Hence, we 
come full circle to consider the relation of abduction to explanation. 
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Abduction and Explanation 
 
In the field of AI, broadly, it has been recognized for quite some time that explanation is an 
exploratory process. Hence, it comes as no sur[rise that schemes for explanatory systems hearken 
to elements of the Peircean model.  For instance, Roger Schank (1986) said: 
 
... understanding means finding an extant knowledge structure in memory and 
placing the information being processed within that structure... Explanations that 
are critical to learning are those that are intended to add knowledge by the 
process of explanation... (p. 27). The interesting case is one in which we find 
ourselves initially failing to comprehend something and then being able to 
construct what we consider to be a fairly plausible explanation that at least 
momentarily  leaves us believing that we have now understood what was  at first 
incomprehensible. In a sense being told an answer can often be a waste of time. 
the process of constructing an explanation forces learning to occur by  causing 
certain questions to be generated that may continue to be asked for a long time... 
(p. 228). 
 
Schank's analysis includes these Peircean elements: (1) Some sort of surprise or anomaly is 
observed, (2)  the learner is reminded of some existing knowledge structure that seems relevant, 
then (3) questions are asked in a deliberative exploratory process. 
 
In the literatures on medical diagnostic systems, abduction has been referenced as the process of 
inferring causal processes based on observations (e.g., symptoms) (see Finin and Morris, 1998). 
Similar ideas have been applied in Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) research, in which 
observed student behaviors are attributed to the student’s reasoning and beliefs, often called the 
program’s “student model.” Indeed, ITS would seem to be an ideal venue for attempting to 
develop computational models of abductive reasoning, in the full Peircean sense. However, the 
fuzziness of the concept of abduction manifests itself in the ITS literature. Indeed, computer 
scientists have proposed "new forms of abduction" (e.g., Stickel, 1988) that are not obviously 
tied to a Peircean notion at all. 
 
Although the term abduction is sometimes invoked in research on intelligent systems, it actually 
does little heavy lifting, either in cognitive modeling or in implementations. For example, in the 
field of machine learning, Mooney (1998) defined abduction as the process of revising a 
knowledge base in order to fit the data. He defined abduction formally as the inductive inference 
across multiple cases of an explanatory hypothesis (cause-effect relation), such that its 
conjunction with observations of a particular case is true, and its conjunction with background 
knowledge is also true. Mooney's linkage of abduction to induction accords with Peirce's 
assertion that "abduction partakes of the nature of induction," but that's as far as it goes. 
 
Another partial alignment with Peircean abduction is the work by Fraser, et al. (1989), who 
sought to develop an ITS for antibody identification in immunohematology. To do that, they 
conducted knowledge elicitation interviews with a domain expert. The interviews focused on the 
recall of critical incidents, in which an initial diagnosis proved wrong.  The researchers' primary 
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intent was to pin diagnostic errors on one or another cognitive bias (e.g., overestimating the 
likelihood of a given hypothesis).  (While the researchers were able to do this, they also learned 
that the expert was aware of possible biases, and performed checks on her probabilistic 
reasoning, by such means as examining base rates.) The expert hematologist's process of 
inferring a diagnosis based on the evidence available was referred to as abduction, but otherwise 
the concept of abduction (as an act of inference) played no role in the research. That said, the 
description of the hematologist's process for testing hypotheses fits with the Peircean model, that 
is, there was an attempt to find converging or disconfirming evidence: an explicit check on the 
lab technician's process for performing the test. 
 
The physics problem solving ITS developed by Maxim Makatchev and his colleagues (2004a,b) 
comes closer to the Peircean model. Given that a learner's mental model of complex systems is 
likely to be incomplete and inconsistent (DiSessa, 1993, 2018), the ITS of Makatchev, et al. was 
intended to help students recognize and correct gaps, illogical relations, and misconceptions in 
their reasoning. In the implementation, student essays about physics problems were rendered as 
sets of propositions. "[T]he student essay is viewed as a fragmentary, incomplete, and possibly 
incorrect proof. Our task is to complete that proof insofar as possible." (p.193). The "proofs" 
were demonstrably coherent arguments that represent the student's mental model. In the 
implementation, it was the ITS (not the learner) who engaged in abductive reasoning, inferring 
the best proof in order to guide the tutoring process. That said, the implementation approximates 
the Peircean scheme in certain respects. First, the implementation included plausibility analysis 
(by assigning weights for alternative explanations) (see row 3 in Table 1). Second, while it might 
be asserted that abduction involves inferring explanations from observations, it might also be 
said that observations are made as a consequence of the explanations (see row 5 in Table 1). 
 
The work by Makatchev et al. illustrates the importance of drawing a distinction between 
abduction (of a sort) that is the program's process of constructing model of student’s reasoning, 
and abduction by the student in the sense of producing the observed behavior that is being 
modeled. In 1970s and most of 1980s, the ITS community equated the program's model of the 
student's knowledge with the student’s knowledge (Sleeman and Brown, 1982). While equating a 
model of the student's knowledge with  the student's mental process may be functionally useful 
for implementation and testing, with respect to being a psychological explanation of student 
behavior, it is on shaky grounds. In other words, while we see elements of the concept of 
abduction in the ITS work—abduction as Peirce described it—there is still a ways to go.   
 
Indeed, according to Bylander, et al. (1991) discovery of a best explanation that is plausible, 
parsimonious (no subset of the premises is sufficient), and complete (i.e., it explains all the data) 
is an intractable (NP-hard) problem. "... choosing between incompatible hypotheses, reasoning 
about cancellation effects among hypotheses, and satisfying the minimal plausibility requirement 
are major factors leading to intractability" (p. 25) (see also Hoffmann, 2011). 
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So What? 
 
What are the implications for XAI system design?   
 
The concepts of abduction—ranging from Peirce's philosophical psychology to modern 
intelligent systems implementations—all speak to the necessity of regarding explanation 
as an exploratory process. XAI systems that automatically generate "explanations" and 
then spoon feed them to users might have some value, but it will necessarily be limited. 
The property of "being an explanation" is not a property of statements, images, displays, 
or any of that. Rather, it characterizes an activity, usually interactive and sometimes 
mixed-initiative, with the source information (i.e., the explainer/instructor) asking 
questions and seeking explanations from the learner as well. 
 
Does the present analysis explain why some XAI projects are succeeding (or might succeed) 
more than others?  
 
Yes. Most explanations offered by XAI systems are entirely local. They do not explain 
"how it works"—the methods used by the AI program. They do not allow (or help) the 
learner to actively explore the boundaries of when and why the AI program works well 
and when and why it works poorly. 
 
Is this a theoretical framework for understanding what the XAI researchers are already doing?   
 
While some researchers in the area of Explainable AI have understood that the XAI 
system must possess (or create) a model of the learner's mental model, most XAI research 
sidesteps this challenge, just as it seems to have sidestepped the decades-old work on 
intelligent tutoring systems. In practice, it seems a bridge too far to load onto the core 
challenge of XAI such additional challenges as robust inference over world knowledge, 
natural language understanding, and the creation of meaningful dialog systems. As a 
long-term area of research, XAI is a nexus for many of the fundamental problems in the 
field of AI.  
 
Does the present analysis lead to design advice?  
 
Yes: An explanation capability should include tools to that enable users/learners to 
discover heuristics for when the AI system works well (and why) and when it doesn't 
work well (and why). The XAI system should allow users to share their discoveries and 
form a community in which the self-explaining of individuals can result in sharable 
knowledge. 
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